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Abstract 
 
How does natural resource abundance influence state and society? Since the late 
1980s, a number of scholars have confronted the widespread predisposition to view 
resources overly optimistically, as a blessing. They claim instead that resources are in 
fact a curse that affects economical, as well as social and political institutions in a 
decidedly negative manner. The aim of this paper is to retest the negative correlation 
between resource abundance and democracy presented by Michael L. Ross in his 
article Does Oil Hinder Democracy? from 2001. This is done with an arguably 
improved measure of natural resource wealth, based on rents, not sales value. In line 
with Ross, I use a cross-sectional time-series data set where observations from all 
sovereign states are compiled over thirty-five years, and analyze them using a feasible 
generalized least squares method. The results reinforce Ross’ main conclusion that oil 
wealth harms democracy and that this effect is valid all over the globe. His claim that 
this property is shared by hard mineral wealth receives only mixed support, however. 
On the whole, these findings serve to strenghten the notion of a curse of natural 
resources and further advances the generality of this theory. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Confounded by his strange misfortune—rich and wretched—he was anxious to escape from 
his unhappy wealth. […] Lifting his hands and shining arms to heaven, he moaned. “Oh 
pardon me, father Lenaeus! I have done wrong, but pity me, I pray, and save me from this 
curse that looked so fair.” 
–King Midas1 
 
 For a long time natural resource abundance has been viewed by scholars and common 
people alike as a blessing for state and society, especially for developing ones. It is argued 
that wealth extracted from nature constitutes a convenient, and perhaps even necessary, 
steppingstone from poverty into economic development and social welfare, two processes 
that will eventually lead to democratization, if one are to believe the persistent 
modernization theory. In the last two decades, however, a growing body of literature has 
emerged that confronts this “widespread popular impression”, to use Jeffrey Sachs’ and 
Andrew Warner’s choice of words. [2001:832] This literature points out that not only have 
resource-intensive states in general failed to perform in line with expectations, but they 
seem to have in fact fared even worse than resource-poor ones. A rivalling hypothesis has 
therefore been promoted: Problems in resource-rich countries arise, not despite natural 
endowments, but rather because of them. This is most reminiscent of the Midas myth, 
although in a modern context. Just like the blessed golden touch of the king turned out to 
be a curse in disguise, resource wealth is found to be a possible cause behind distinctly 
negative outcomes. The discourse have accordingly often been called ‘the curse of natural 
resources’. 
 
 It was in the late 1980s when economists, most notably Gelb [1988] and Auty [1990], 
first started emphasizing the counterintuitive performance of resource-intensive nations. 
Revenues generated by resource extraction2 were found to largely wither away and even 
have a pronounced negative impact on the domestic economy. Sachs & Warner [1995:16] 
later reinforced these findings by showing that these states have actually been 
economically outperformed by resource-poor ones. Among the eighteen developing 
countries that experienced growth rates of 2% or more per annum between 1970 and 
1992, they distinguish only two as being resource intensive.3 Another much-cited scholar, 
Terry Lynn Karl [1997], fittingly describes this situation as a paradox of plenty. 
 A second aspect of the curse is that resources seem to influence the onset, as well as 
the duration and intensity of civil war. One of the seminal studies, made by Paul Collier 
and Anke Hoeffler [1998], for example found the relationship between natural resource 
wealth and twenty-seven civil wars to be strong and curvilinear: Natural riches increase the 
risk of conflict up to the level where they, measured as primary commodity exports, 
constitute about a third of GDP. The risk then drops, presumably because the 
governments in these nations become rich enough to either deter violent opposition or 
defend themselves if it arises. Several scholars also stress the dysfunctionality of these 
wars, since they are often driven by greed rather than grievance. (See e.g. Le Billon 
[2001:562], Collier & Hoeffler [2004] and Weinstein [2005].) 
 
1 Cited from Ovid’s Metamorphosis, book 11 (http://www.theoi.com/Text/OvidMetamorphoses11.html). 
2 It should be noted that the discourse does not provide an agreed-upon definition of natural resources. 
Primary commodities, such as petroleum, hard minerals and gemstones, do however attract most interest by 
far while agricultural goods are most often ignored or excluded. (Although some focus on e.g. forestry (Ross 
[2001a]), plantation crops (Isham et al. [2002]), or agricultural dependency (Humphreys [2005]).)  
3 They note that Botswana would have qualified also, if data had not been missing. 
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 It is however a third sub literature that is in the focus of this paper, and this is also the 
newest and least investigated one. A handful of publications have put forward yet another, 
equally adverse, claim: Natural riches also seem to be harmful for democracy. 
 
 Michael L. Ross’ article Does Oil Hinder Democracy? from 2001 is arguably the most 
influential contribution to this field of study.4 Initially he presents the theory of the rentier 
state, which has traditionally been applied only to Mideastern petro-states and states that 
democracy may be inhibited in countries where the state controls substantial revenues, so 
called rents. This is most often the case in countries rich in natural resources. He then 
employs a pooled cross-country data set over all sovereign states from 1971 to 1997 and 
statistically tests the generality of this claim using export figures for hydrocarbon and hard 
minerals. Other potentially important variables, such as per capita GDP, are controlled to 
ensure greater confidence that it is actually resources that cause harm. In summary, Ross 
finds robust support for several propositions, most notably the following three:  
• Oil does hurt democracy. A one standard deviation rise in his Oil variable predicts a 
.49 drop in an eleven point democracy index, over a five-year period. [:342] 
• This attribute is shared by hard minerals, although to a lesser degree.  
• The phenomenon is not strictly regional: Oil and minerals have anti-democratic effects 
all over the globe.  
 
 The aim of this paper is to retest the findings of Ross’ analysis but with one decisive 
modification: I replace his export-based measure of natural resource abundance with a 
rent-based one. A theoretical, as well as empirical, argument as to why this modification is 
essential is provided in section 3 below. Replicating Ross’ research, I employ cross-
sectional time-series data over all sovereign states between 1970 and 2004 in search for 
answers to three questions: 
 
1.) Does hydrocarbons hinder democracy? 
2.) Does hard minerals hinder democracy? 
3.) Is this effect regional or global? 
 
 The paper also has a broader aim. While most studies of the resource curse 
phenomenon search for, and test, key conditioning circumstances that could possibly 
influence the effects, this paper intentionally retreats one level and only retests the 
principal correlation. In a recent article, Andrew Rosser emphasizes the considerable 
impact the notion of a resource curse has had on the ‘old’ attitude that resources constitute 
a blessing: “So influential has this literature been that the conventional wisdom now is 
arguably the exact opposite of what it was prior to the late 1980s.” [2006:268] I partly 
disagree. However influential the resource curse scholars have been, their findings are 
hardly “widely accepted” (ibid.), probably because of the controversial policy implications 
the theory carries. James Mahon’s statement from 1992 that "few have argued that there 
is an advantage in resource poverty" still holds validity. [:252] Instead, common people, 
officials and politicians alike seem to almost without exception endorse the possibilities of 
resources, rather than the dangers. Former President Bill Clinton claimed for example in 
2000 that "[w]ith one-fifth of Africa's people, and vast human and natural resources, a 
revitalized Nigeria can be the economic and political anchor of West Africa and the leader 
 
4 Ross currently works out of UCLA as a associate professor and most of his publications are available at 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/. 
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of the continent."5 Even related scholars appear to sometimes view the bonanza of natural 
riches in an overly optimistic way, such as William Ascher, who seem to have missed the 
initial findings in the field stating that "[the resource curse] concerns miss a crucial point: 
natural resources represent potential wealth; without the resources, developing countries 
would be even poorer." [1999:6]6  
 This discrepancy between scholarly findings on the one hand and the widespread 
predisposition to view resources overly optimistically on the other, calls for more and better 
knowledge that could influence future policy-making. For while the myth tells that Midas in 
the end was relieved of his golden curse by the Gods, the same fate is not likely to happen 
in the real world to countries rich in resources.7  
 
 
 The paper continues with a theoretical section in which the theory of the rentier state is 
presented in detail and then I unravel the reasons as to why it is is important to measure 
rents, not export value as Ross does. Section 4 describes the method and the variables 
used in this study before section 5 reports the results from the statistical analysis. A 
concluding chapter summarizes the findings.  
 
 
2. Natural Resources & Democratic Performance 
 
It matters whether a state relies on taxes from extractive industries, agricultural production, 
foreign aid, remittances, or international borrowing because these different sources of 
revenues, whatever their relative economic merits or social import, have powerful (and quite 
different) impact on the state’s institutional development […] Simply stated, the revenues a 
state collects, how it collects them, and the uses to which it puts them define its nature.  
Terry Lynn Karl [1997:13] (My italics.) 
 
The budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies. 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, 19918 
 
 The idea that the source of income might have a pronounced effect on the government 
has only quite recently entered broad comparative studies on development and 
democratization. In the early 1990s, scholars began to examine the role of broad taxation 
as a cause of democratic transition and the core assumption, often called the ‘no taxation 
without representation’ claim, crudely have the following rationale: In a tax state, revenues 
from below are assumed to be exchanged for representation and accountability from the 
top. Taxes thus form a vital democratic leverage in the relationship between citizens and 
political elites, creating a state-society balance that encourages bargaining and 
consensus. Empirical proof of this theory is derived from European history.9 
 However, it is possible to turn this theory upside down, change the claim to ‘no 
representation without taxation’, and along similar logic explain the lack of democratization 
in states with substantial non-tax revenues. This is the rentier state theory. If there is a 
 
5 Cited from http://www.ngex.com/nigeria/govt/president/clinton_obasanjospeech.htm 
6 But note the contrasting cynicism of Auty [2001:33]: "One might be forgiven for concluding ... that the faster 
resource-abundant countries deplete their resource rents, the sooner they can embark on the advantageous 
path of competitive industrialization.” 
7 With due respect towards those who put their faith in divine intervention.  
8 Cited in Moore [2004:298]. 
9 For a thorough review see Moore [2004] and [2007]. Ross [2004] tests the claim in a large N statistical 
analysis.  
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guaranteed external source of income, i.e. rents, why should any political leader pursue 
democracy or promote broad development, and thereby create conflicting interests within 
the state? The most effective strategy to ensure continuous rule in such states is by buying 
off and beating down, thus making bad policies good politics. 
 
 The economist Hazem Beblawi is most often credited with defining the characteristics of 
a rentier state. In such a state, he contends, a rentier situation predominate the 
governmental revenue structure in which (i) rents are acquired from foreign sources, (ii) 
they accrue directly to the government, and (iii) very few citizens are actually participants 
in the rent-generating business, with the majority only being beneficiaries of distribution. 
(Ross [2001b:329]) 
 The fiscal situation in a rentier state is therefore typified by a dual capacity: the ability to 
draw sizable rents from external sources and subsequently to discriminately distribute this 
wealth internally. Political and economical control are thus intertwined and this presumably 
affects the framework for decision-making. The close links between economic and political 
power make the rentier state somewhat similar to a socialist one, something that according 
to Karl [1999:37] eludes most observers.10  
 Before moving on, it should be noted that Beblawi’s definition make no claim as to what 
could generate these rents. Oil is indeed the rentier commodity par excellence, due to 
enormous surpluses easily captured by the state, and its capital intensive, rather than 
labour intensive, extraction. The same may however be true for other so-called point-
source commodities, such as hard minerals, as well as for transport fees and even foreign 
aid in otherwise poor countries. 11 However, with the exception of oil, few rent sources 
have potential to dominate the state budget. 
 
 The benefits of holding power in a rentier state are of course, for any politician bent on 
self-enrichment, substantial. Large rents make the state a prize to be possessed, rather 
than a forum for consensual rule, and simultaneously constitute a significant incumbency 
advantage, by providing the means of maintaining hold of power.12 That is why Lam & 
Wantchekon [2003] label the rentier phenomenon ‘a political dutch disease’; meaning a 
political system which tends to suffocate any opposition and indeed all other actors.13  
 In short, rentier wealth creates and perpetuates strong states with weak societies, thus 
keeping democracy at bay. As presented below, contributors to this theory point to at least 
three different reasons why democratic transition will not occur in those states. 
 
 
10 Ironically Lenin wrote in 1916: "The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this 
circumstance cannot fail to influence all the sociopolitical conditions of the countries concerned". (Cited in 
Ross [2001b:329]). 
11 Note that collecting rents is a non-contributory activity. It is instead characterized by the collector having 
control over other actor’s access to certain production opportunities. Since a state de facto can exercise this 
control over just about any branch of industry or commerce, for example through special tariffs or even 
nationalization, everything could theoretically speaking generate rents. 
12 The notion that political actors act only in their own self-interest of course springs from a rational actor-
perspective. According to Ascher [1999:ix] this is the “easy” explanation. “The trick”, he continues, “is to 
grapple with the much more complex reality that governmental leaders have complicated programmatic 
objectives, while not being so naive as to ignore their self-centered political motivation.” (ibid. :x) Rosser 
[2006:21] backs this view, claiming that the rational actor approach is blind to relevant structurality. 
Nevertheless, there is often a point in analyzing a phenomenon from an aggregate, and perhaps simplified, 
view. Picturing political leaders autonomous of social pressures makes it easier to perceive the isolated 
effect of resource rents on their behavior. For example Robinson et al. [2005] argue for this stripped 
perspective in their examination of how resource windfalls lure politicians into patronage politics. 
13 Esanov et al. [2001:15] present a striking example of this in the context of former Soviet states. 
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• Autonomy 
 According to the ‘no taxation without representation’-claim, broad taxation leads to 
engaged citizens and subsequent formation of civil society groups, either because people 
resist paying the taxes or because they want to ensure a proper and effective use of them. 
The rentier scholars adapt this logic and propose that since resource states have no need 
of taxation their societies lack this engagement. The state is almost a private enterprise 
providing the citizens with certain benefits without emptying their pockets and relieved 
from taxation they presumably do not demand anything of the state in return. 
 This ‘democratic apathy’ can of course be pursued more or less consciously, e.g. 
through low-quality educational systems that keep common people sidelined (see Birdsall 
et al. [2001]) or propaganda endorsing the nation as the core of community to hinder civil 
society development and quell critical voices from opposition or media (see Lowi [2004]). 
To stay in power, political leaders even employ foreign firms and workforces which keep 
power concentrated and leaves the population immobilized and locked in poverty. An 
agreement between Sudan and China has for example brought thousands of Chinese 
workers to Sudan to open up new oil fields in the oil-rich, though unruly, south. In return 
Sudan has received substantial military aid, and according to an Amnesty Report even 
Chinese armed guards.14 
 
• Redistribution 
 Support can also be acquired and consolidated through a comprehensive system of 
patronage politics and clientelism. Rents serve as a lubricant, insulating governments by 
dampening dissent and buying off opposition. Oft-cited Giacomo Luciani, has suggested 
that rentier states do “not need to formulate anything deserving the appellation of 
economic policy: all [they need] is an expenditure policy.”15  
 The rentier state both provides substantial funds easy to misallocate and invites little 
public scrutiny. An embezzling politician will, once he reaches office, counteract demands 
for transparency, and eventually patronage becomes ‘the only game in town’. In small 
states, such as Brunei or Qatar, the patronage system can in fact shelter the whole 
population. 
 
• Repression 
 If redistribution functions as a carrot, repression works the other way around; as a whip. 
Similar to other states, resource states can resolve to violent means in quelling dissent. It 
does not really matter if people actually are pacified (the autonomy claim) or bought off 
(the redistribution claim) since a powerful police-, military- or security force can step in and 
suppress any manifestation with democratic intent. However, whereas in a state reliant on 
tax revenue, too much repression would lead to economical self-strangulation, hard force 
in a rentier state will not affect governmental funds to the same extent. 
 Resource states do appear to have large military expenditures, at least as a proportion 
of GDP.16 Karl [1999:39] claims that OPEC members on average have spent more than 
10% of GNP on defense, a figure that is several times higher than most countries.  
 
 
14 Sources: Human Rights Watch 25/11/03: “China’s Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil”. HRW Index No. 
1564322912. Insight on the News 24/07/00: “Chinese Troops Wreak Havoc in Southern Sudan” by Katherine 
Edwards.  
15 Cited in Rosser [2006:16]. 
16 Of course, in total spending the USA outclass everyone. In 2006 their defense budget alone amounted to 
46% of world military expenditure, with the second largest spender, the UK, only reaching 5%. Source: The 
SIPRI Yearbook 2007.  
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 The rentier theory has not, however, escaped criticism. (Indeed, no theory should.) 
Scholars have in particular challenged the idea that tax breaks and rent-redistribution 
would actually keep the public politically inactive and even content with an undemocratic 
regime. Lowi [2004] suggests e.g. that patronage may “camouflage” but seldom “mitigate” 
societal dissent in these states, making “uninterrupted distribution of rents … the key to 
their survival.” [:98] Okruhlik [1999] asserts that rent revenues for a fact do not relieve the 
state from democratic pressures: "Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, in both 
have and have-not states, there are demands for social justice, meaningful economic 
development, and political reform." [:296] She instead emphasizes the counter effect of 
discriminatory methods, such as patronage and clientelism, suggesting that the very 
measures to promote, or enforce, continuous rule actually lay the foundation for its own 
demise. (See also Lam & Wantchekon [2003:5])  
 Okruhlik [1999] also makes a more basic comment: The Western scholar, she notes, 
often approaches the rentier situations in Mideastern and North African countries with a 
largely subconscious bias. He, or she, tends to regard the state with a Weberian 
conception of statehood, overstating the exchange between state and citizens, and 
evaluate the society with Marxist eyes, exaggerating the importance of class structure in 
countries most often defined by other divisions, such as family, tribe, region, and religion. 
With this biased approach it is not surprising that it is exactly these factors that are found 
missing. Herb [2003] also delivers a more general blow at the praxis of employing a theory 
derived from the Western experience to explain a non-Western phenomenon. While taxes 
may have had a prominent role in the democratic transitions of many Western states, they 
could very possibly function differently in other places. 
 
 The common theme in the critique above is that it highlights potential theoretical hubris. 
The summarizing verdict of Okruhlik [1999:308], for example, is dire: "The idea of the 
rentier state has come to imply so much that it has lost its content." Ross’ 2001 article  
acknowledges this hubris, and tries to amend it. The body of empirical evidence 
underpinning the rentier theory has been coming from selected case studies of Mideast 
petro-states, and this is problematic, he notes, since "theories of the rentier state [thus] 
have been applied only to states identified ex ante as rentier states, leaving little variation 
on an independent or dependent variable." [1999:313] This approach also ignores Islam, 
an important control variable. Meanwhile, more extensive democratization studies have 
traditionally excluded these rentier states, on the basis of them being sui generis. (Ross 
[2001b:328]) However, the framework of the rentier theory does not limit itself to Muslim 
petro-states but is arguably valid in all cases of extreme resource-rent dependency and 
the reasons to exclude the Mideast from general democratization studies are at best thin 
and bordering on reductionist thinking.  
 The aim of Ross’ research is therefore to test the generality of the rentier theory, and to 
achieve this he uses an all-inclusive sample frame consisting of all sovereign states and 
he also takes several important control variables into account. The three questions that 
structure his, and mine, study serve the same purpose.17 The first question, ‘Does 
hydrocarbons hinder democracy?’, tests the core claim of the rentier theory by regressing 
hydrocarbon generated rentierism on the democratic performance of a state. Since oil and 
gas have rentier capabilities par excellence, the effect should be visible here if anywhere. 
Bear in mind though that this test carries a potential bias against the Mideastern region, 
which houses several huge oil exporters, and also against Islam, since some non-
Mideastern petro-states also have a sizable Muslim population (e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia, 
 
17 While Ross’ questions are not identical to those I use, they are most similar. (See Ross [2001b:325-327].) 
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Brunei and Nigeria). Having said that, there are other petro-states included here that are 
neither Mideastern nor Muslim and they constitute a variation of great importance.  
 The second question, ‘Does hard minerals hinder democracy?’, expands the original 
proposition in a sectoral dimension18 by assessing whether other minerals (e.g. copper, 
zinc and gold) share the possible properties of hydrocarbons. Since many mineral-reliant 
states are located outside the Mideast, this test increases the desired variation. It 
evaluates whether petroleum has some unique effects on the state or if the perpetrator 
rather could be rentierism per se.  
 The final question, ‘Is this effect regional or global?’ , wants to determine if the effects 
are valid all over the world or if they are somehow tied to one region or another. This 
geographical expansion is tested by adding regional dummies to the regression, 
controlling for the regions most correlated with petro-, and mineral states respectively. 
How does this affect the results? The breaking of sectoral and geographical barriers really 
put the expanded rentier theory to the test, and arguably increases the generality of the 
final results.  
 
 
3. Measuring Natural Resources 
 
 All the scholars studying the resource curse phenomenon who want to assert a certain 
claim one way or the other experience the same predicament: How do I define and 
measure ‘natural resource abundance’? Needless to say, this measure is of profound 
significance, being the foundation on which all findings will be built. Rosser’s [2006] literary 
review highlights some basic confusion in this aspect, both concerning how to measure 
(the ratio of natural resource export to GDP, the ratio of resource export to total export or a 
non-export based measure?) as well as what to measure (primary commodities, point-
source commodities, various minerals or just hydrocarbons?). This is also a focal point for 
criticism aimed at Ross’ study.  
 Ross has in his mind to evaluate a presumed effect of natural resources on democracy. 
‘Natural resources’ is in his case defined as rentierism, since his theoretical foundation is 
the theory of the rentier state.19 To construct this measure, his independent variable, he 
follows the standard procedure, which has been to do a market value approach and in a 
straightforward manner calculate the face value of oil and mineral exports as a fraction of 
GDP. One of the reasons most studies used this approach is that until recently it has been 
the only data readily available. But, as Mick Moore [2007:21] quite firmly states; “these are 
not the right things to measure. [---] The proper measure of the likely political impact of 
natural resource wealth should begin with the rents, not sales value.” In a more recent 
article, Ross [2006:266] himself in fact notes that “[t]his ‘resource exports to GDP’ 
measure was originally developed by Sachs & Warner (1995) and later adopted by Collier 
& Hoeffler (1998) and many others—including, regrettably, me”. (My italics.) So what 
distinguishes a rent-based measure from an export-based one? While the latter uses 
simple sales value, i.e. produced quantity multiplied by world market price, the former take 
country-specific production costs into account.20 Is it e.g. not a reasonable bet that the 
costs of lifting a barrel of oil from beneath the sand dunes of the Gahwar Field in Saudi 
 
18 See Ross [2001b:327]. 
19 Note that he also limit himself to examine rentierism generated by hydrocarbons and hard minerals. 
20 With Moore’s choice of words, rent is “the proportion of the sales value of a product that remains after all 
production and marketing costs, including some allowance for ‘normal profit’, have been accounted for”. 
[2007:21] 
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Arabia are significantly lower than drilling for one in the Ekofisk Oil Field, on the bottom of 
the unruly North Sea (and pay Norwegian salaries for having it done to boot)? A rent-
based measure therefore presents an arguably more valid estimate of the final size of 
rents in government than does the ‘resource exports to GDP’ measure. Moore [2007], 
along with Wantchekon [1999:20], Herb [2003:2], and Rosser [2006:268] are some of 
those who support this more appropriate course of action.21   
 
 The data necessary for constructing this new, arguably improved variable are now 
available through a World Bank environmental economics project.22 That this is the ideal 
data for my purpose is something two of the originators of this project also highlight:  
 
A particularly appealing topic for further research would be an exploration of the “resource 
curse” hypothesis. […] The data developed for the genuine savings analysis should permit 
more precise definitions of resource dependence, permitting the hypothesis to be re-tested. 
Hamilton & Clemens [1998:12] 
 
The following example, based on actual data, undeniably demonstrates the importance of 
measuring rents, not export value. 
 
In 1982 Namibia produced about 50,000 metric tonnes of copper and Malaysia produced 
about 30,000 tonnes. The traditional approach would use the market value of these 
quantities (the average price per tonne in 1982 was $1543) and find that the copper income 
for Malaysia that year was about three fifths out of Namibia's, or to be more exact; about $46 
millions, to Namibia's $77 millions.23 However, it is important to account for production costs 
and this basically cuts the rent in half.24 The next step is however more decisive. As it 
happens, the rental rates differ quite considerably in between the two countries; Malaysia 
mined and milled their copper at a strikingly low cost per unit, only about 10% of market price 
that year, while Namibia produced theirs at an rather high cost, more than 70% of market 
price. The result is certainly conclusive: Despite Namibia producing 20 000 tonnes more than 
Malaysia, the rent estimation shows that they only made just about half the profit; $21 million 
to Malaysia's $41 millions. 
 
 In my view, there are few reasons to doubt that the overall result of using a rent-based 
measure of natural resource abundance provides a considerably more accurate foundation 
for analyzing it’s presumed effect on democracy, than does the old-fashioned approach. 
 
 
4. Method & Material 
 
 The aim of this paper is, as already stated, to retest the findings of Ross’ statistical 
analysis from 2001. Except for one decisive modification, that his export-based measure of 
natural resource abundance is replaced with a rent-based one, I have more or less tried to 
copy his approach.25 (See Ross [2001b:337].) It should be noted though, that it is not in 
 
21 It is of interest to note that while Rosser and Moore both have published working papers for the Institute of 
Development Studies, they reach divergent conclusions regarding the results of using a rent-based measure. 
While Moore [2007:21] states that the data support the ‘resource wealth impedes democracy’-claim, Rosser 
argue that it so far has “provided only mixed support”. (Rosser [2006:268] 
22 See http://go.worldbank.org/3AWKN2ZOY0 for further information. 
23 Of course, it is by all means not certain that they both actually exported all their copper that year.  
24 The average rental rate for copper 1985-94 was 0.49. (Hamilton & Clemens [1998:8])  
25 The study by Ross has in fact already been retested with a rent-based measure. Collier & Hoeffler 
[2005:17] deal briefly with Ross' claims, and yield affirmative results. Their primary objective is, however, to 
examine the role of rents in government as an intermediate factor between resources and economic growth. 
the scope of this paper to put the proposed causal mechanisms to the test (which Ross 
does). Figure 1 below illustrates the basic research model used in this study.  
 
Figure 1 
Research Model 
 
Hydrocarbon 
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 To test the hypotheses regarding rentierism and democracy I follow Ross and use 
statistical analysis of a cross-sectional time-series (CSTS) data set, in which I have pooled 
annual data from all sovereign states with a population of more than one hundred 
thousand, between 1970 and 2004.26 This approach ensure as much variance on all 
variables as possible, offering a sample frame that includes not only predefined rentiers, 
but also non-rentiers, possible rentiers, and everything in between the three. This aspect is 
of utmost importance when testing generality.  
 To study a political phenomenon, such as the resource curse hypothesis, using CSTS 
data with insights from both spatial comparison and from dynamic research over time, may 
undeniably offer great analytical strength. Even so, this is a design not seldom avoided 
since using data jointly structured in time and space also presents the analyst with some 
intricate complications; “the opportunity to be wrong is considerably enhanced when the 
design is two-dimensional", as Stimson [1985:916] notes. 
 In short, the statistical assumptions justifying the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach 
stipulate that the error terms must be uncorrelated with each other and have equal, or 
constant, variances. In the context of CSTS data three violations of these assumptions are 
expected to appear: Observations of different panels of units may be correlated to each 
other, leading to spatial correlation of errors27; the errors of one single unit probably 
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Besides, they use different sample frame, time frame, model, and method. In my view, Ross' findings are of 
such importance that they are worthy of a less deviating scrutiny. 
26 CSTS data is characterized by its use of fixed units repeatedly observed over time. This distinguishes it 
from panel data which are built upon randomly selected units, and while the latter are in need of a large N 
sample frame, the usefulness of CSTS data is dependent on a large T. The thirty-five serial observations of 
this study are however more than enough. Beck [2001b:274] characterizes T < 10 as being problematic.  
27 Although this violation is in fact caused by omitted variables and thus is an error of the observer, it is not 
always easily corrected for since the researcher sometimes cannot, or maybe does not want to, include more 
variables. (Beck [2001b:281]) 
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correlate over time, also called autocorrelation, and finally, the variances of errors may be 
unit-specific, not equally distributed, a phenomenon known as heteroscedasticity. 
 These violations would cripple the OLS estimation of errors and as Beck & Katz 
[1995:2] observe: "Incorrect standard errors will lead us to be either too confident or 
insufficiently confident about whether our findings might merely be statistical artifacts." 
OLS is therefore no longer the optimal statistical estimator. 
 I follow Ross’ lead and instead use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
method, which corrects for the cross-sectional problems of spatial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity.28 I counterbalance the problem of autocorrelation over time by adding 
a lagged dependent variable to the right-hand side of the equation. The regressions are 
run with Stata 9
 
 I derive my dependent variable29, Regime, from the Polity IV data set30, constructed by 
Marshall & Jaggers [2002]. This measure evaluates the democratic performance of a state 
on an eleven point interval scale that stretches from 0 (perfect authoritarian) to 11 (perfect 
democratic).  
 Building upon the argument presented in section 3, which defines rent as the  difference 
between country-specific extraction costs and international market value, and using the 
World Bank data, I construct a rent-based independent variable with which I replace Ross’ 
export-based one. The natural resources for which rent data are available are oil, gas, 
hard coal, brown coal, bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver, and 
gold, with the data covering thirty-five years; from 1970 to 2004. For every year, and every 
country, I divide the oil-, gas-, and coal rents by GDP to construct a Hydrocarbons 
variable, and I divide the ten other mineral rents by GDP to construct a Hard Minerals 
variable. Rentierism is consequently measured between 0 (no rentierism) and 1 (total 
rentierism). 
 
 The World Bank data I employ here carry some possible weaknesses. First, it is 
important to realize that the adjustment for country-specific extraction costs is not 
completely  accurate. Here follows a few potential drawbacks:31  
i) Some commodities, e.g. gas, have no universal world market price. In these cases 
annual averages have been derived from existing prices.  
ii) The average extraction cost of most countries is in fact not country-specific but 
obtained from a surrogate country with similar conditions. These figures are therefore 
approximate since small deviations between countries are expected to exist.  
iii) Countries may sell their product for internal consumption for a price well below the 
international price.32 This would lead to somewhat overstated resource rents.  
iv) Of course, every cost not calculated would induce rent-overestimations. 
 
 Secondly, using only the World Bank data brings at least two limitations to the fore. 
First, they provide data on only fourteen different mineral commodities, neglecting others 
(such as diamonds and aluminum). Second, rents not generated by natural resources, e.g. 
 
28 Beck & Katz [1995] in fact suggest that the best approach is OLS with panel corrected standard errors. 
That Ross refers to their article and still chooses the FGLS method is curious. Aware of this I follow Ross’ 
approach. 
29 All variables and their specified sources are more fully presented in Appendix A. 
30 Ross uses the Polity 98 data set. 
31 For a more detailed account see Hamilton & Clemens [1999] and Bolt et al. [2002]. 
32 Consider for example the presumably euphoric Venezuelan drivers who pay about $0.07 per gallon 
gasoline, according to recent figures. Source: The New York Times 30/10/07: Venezuela’s Gas Prices 
Remain Low, but the Political Costs May Be Rising by Simon Romero. 
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various transit fees over land or through canals, are of obvious reasons also absent. Both 
restrictions result in an undervaluation of rents in some governments, and especially the 
first one could seriously harm the Hard Minerals variable used in this paper. Until data on 
more minerals are available the validy of this variable is unfortunately undercut and any 
results must unfortunately be viewed with this in mind. 
 
 To simply regress rentierism on a democracy score is certainly not enough, since any 
correlation between the two might be either spurious or maybe caused by a third 
underlying variable. It is e.g. possible that it is actually high levels of per capita GDP that 
correlate with democracy and that rentierism only thrives in relatively poor countries. In 
such a situation rentierism could be a result of poverty and therefore covariate with 
authoritarianism but not be a determinant of it. Even though statistical analysis can never 
prove anything else than correlation, we can enhance the likelihood that resources actually 
do play a causal role. For this purpose I include important control variables.  
 Income is widely held as a powerful predictor of the democracy score of a state. (Ross 
[2001b:338]) "The more well-to-do nation, the greater the chances it will sustain 
democracy", as Seymour Martin Lipset [1959:56] stated. I control for Income, measured as 
real per capita GDP. Data are obtained from Penn World Table 6.2 by Heston et al. [2006]. 
 Another variable of import is religion. Controlling for religious and cultural influence is 
called for since Islam both correlates positively with oil and gas and negatively with 
democracy. (Ross 2001:338) By testing the explanatory power of natural endowments, the 
sometimes voiced claim that Islam carry an anti-democratic essence are simultaneously 
scrutinized.33 Islam is measured as the Muslim percentage of the state’s population.34 
 Since the strongest predictor of a state’s regime often is its own past, I include a five 
year lagged dependent variable, Regimet-5 (where t is the year). Apart from diminishing 
country-specific historical and cultural bias, this method has two additional advantages: It 
both makes it possible to measure dynamic change over time and corrects for first-order 
autocorrelation (mentioned above). This process is panel-specific in that it allows the 
degree of autocorrelation to vary from country to country.  
 While Regimet-5 encapsulates country-specific history, I also want to uncover possible 
region-specific effects. It is possible that the correlation between rents and authoritarian 
rule merely reflects the political situation of a region that also happens to be endowed with 
natural resources. I therefore add three regional dummy variables to the regression, 
Mideast, Arabian Peninsula, and Sub-Saharan Africa, to account for the most resource-
intensive regions in the set. (In accordance with Ross [2001b:346] I include the Arabian 
Peninsula dummy since the Mideast could be a too encompassing geographical unit.)  
 Yet one determinant of democratic strength seems to be European heritage. I will not 
present any theories as to what make ‘Western’ states susceptible to democracy (or non-
Western ones unsusceptible), and I take no position regarding possible causes behind this 
effect.35 I merely control for it with OECD, a dummy that is coded 1 for the twenty-five 
high-income members and 0 for all others. 
 Finally, since several petro-states have small populations and the rentier effects in 
these could be given overly much influence, I also want to capture the potential importance 
 
33 Bear in mind, however, that Catholicism was also negatively correlated with democracy until the mid-
1970s. (Ross [2001b:339]) 
34 This measure is very likely too quantitative. Consider that Iran had as many muslim citizens 1978 as in 
1979. However, in 1979 Khomeyni rose to power, with a significant Islamization of government as a result. In 
this context, estimating the effect of Islam on the state by using muslim percentage of the population is 
clearly a non-optimal process. All that said, I follow Ross’ debatable approach.  
35 Ross [2001b:339] presents a more extensive argumentation.  
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of size. Size is a dummy, coded 1 if a state has a population of more than one million, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
 It is possible, and some would say probable, that the causality regarding all the 
correlations of the resource curse phenomenon is misinterpreted. Instead of being a 
cause, natural resources could in fact be an effect. That is: 
• An economy in stagnation looses diversity and momentum and therefore becomes ever 
more reliant on primary commodity exports.  
• In a nation struck by civil war the only lucrative economic activity at hand is resource 
extraction.  
• Since an undemocratic regime cannot rely on obedient tax-paying citizens, and does not 
want to diversify the economy (which could lead to a diffusion of power) natural 
resources are the autocrat’s best friend.  
Under all these three conditions, resources (or rather resource-reliance) could have the 
appearance of causing bad effects when the relationship is actually the other way around.  
 What came first, the resources or the problems?36 This, to be sure, is a hotly debated 
subject.37 Some scholars stress the importance of institutions as determining the impact of 
resources (see especially Mehlum et al. [2006] and Rosser [2006]), while others argue the 
other way around (most prominently Sokoloff & Engerman [2000] and Easterly [2002]). 
Without delving into this dispute, I think that while institutions surely have important 
influence, it is not reductionistic to put at least some blame on resources per se, first and 
foremost due to the fact that there are simply too few countries on which resource wealth 
have had a positive influence. Among developing nations, references are invariably made 
to the same examples; Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, and sometimes Indonesia, and they 
strike me more as exceptions to a rule than anything else. However, to ensure greater 
confidence that the causal direction is not reverse I use a five year lag on all independent 
and control variables. The regressions are run with Stata 9.1.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
 A total of 193 countries over 35 years would yield a theoretical maximum of 6755 
observations, but since several states have not existed the full time series and some 
variables do not cover the full set of observations, the effective number of cases utilized in 
the regression below is 3395. A first look at a histogram over the Hydrocarbons variable 
reveals a heavily skewed frequency: Most countries by far did either not extract any oil, 
gas, or coal at all, or did so only in negligible quantities. About 62% of the observations 
show rentierism rates lower than 0.01, i.e. hydrocarbon rents constituting less than 1% of 
 
36 This is of course a simplified question. A phenomenon of this kind of course has a complex causal 
structure with resources being both cause and effect. In addition a bouncing effect probably occurs between 
the economical, political and social problems: Democracy is for example inherently fragile in poor countries. 
Authoritarian politics tend to promote violence as the only decisive means of arbitration and violence then 
induces even more authoritarian measures, such as martial law and curfews. Civil war is of course 
disastrous for the economy, and so on. Eventually, low-income resource-states get caught in a catch-22, 
where poverty and misery forces them to extract bad wealth and this wealth forces them further into misery 
and poverty.  
37 Neither, according to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney. "The problem”, he claims, “is that the good Lord 
didn’t see fit to put oil and gas reserves where there are democratic governments." (Cited in Ross 
[2001b:337]) 
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GDP. 15.5%, or 764 cases, display rentierism of more than 0.1.38 This skewness is even 
greater when it comes to Hard Minerals, with more than 78% of all observations below 
0.01, and only 163 above 0.1.39 The conclusion drawn from this is that relatively very few 
countries qualify as being rentiers and that the ten hard minerals included here are either 
not extracted in volumes great enough, or are perhaps not valuable enough, to constitute 
as large a fraction of state revenues as are hydrocarbons. The top twenty hydrocarbon 
rentiers, as well as the top ten hard mineral rentiers, of the 1990s are listed in Appendix C.  
 
 When looking at the hydrocarbon rentiers in that list, their most prominent feature is that  
during this period they were all more or less authoritarian, perhaps with the exceptions of 
Venezuela and Russia.40 The mean democratic score of these twenty countries between 
1990 and 1999, was in fact a mere 1.06, which lends some initial empirical support to the 
resource curse hypothesis. Below I enhance this support by using a broader time range 
and including valuable points of comparison. Figure 2 illustrates the mean democratic 
performance of five groups of observations between 1970 and 2003. “Full Set” self-
evidently covers all observations in set (4756 obs.). “High GDP p.c.” includes all 
observations with a GDP per capita of more than $10,000 (1134 obs.), and “Low GDP p.c.” 
includes all observations with a GDP per capita of less than $10,000 GDP per capita (3246 
obs.). The group “Hydrocarbon Rentiers” represents all observations where hydrocarbon 
rents constitute more than 10% of GDP (676 obs.), and finally “Mineral Rentiers” consists 
of all observations where hard mineral rents constitute more than 5% of GDP (248 obs.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Democratic Performance in the World 1970-2003 
 
 
38 In 16 cases the rentierism exceeds 1.0. This is possible because rents and GDP are calculated using 
different measures. Of these sixteen cases thirteen belongs to Turkmenistan, two to Iraq, and one to Kuwait. 
All are coded as missing.  
39 Three observations display values below zero (se fn. above). They are coded as missing. 
40 Although in both states democracy has without doubt been eroded in recent years. 
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 As demonstrated the mean democratic score for hydrocarbon rentiers is strikingly low. 
While the world as a whole in recent years has become ‘more democratic than not’, petro-
states seem to be permanently stuck in the bottom third. When looking at the graphs 
above, the close relationship between democracy and GDP per capita is prominent, but 
even though hydrocarbon rentiers are decisively outperformed by poor countries this is not 
due to any poverty on their behalf, quite the opposite. The average GDP per capita for the 
rentiers is $12,568, compared to the scarce $3340 for the “Low GDP p.c.” group. Hence, 
the difference between their scores is even more dramatic than a first glance suggests.  
 As for hard mineral rentiers, on the other hand, the results are harder to analyze. In 
comparison with the other groups, the graph is rather unstable, probably due to relatively 
few observations. Throughout the 1990s they actually achieve higher democratic scores 
than the overall average, but these results should be taken with a grain of salt since each 
annual average here is derived from only three to six observations. Of course, the very fact 
that there are not more mineral rentiers than that does harm the theoretical speculation.41 
 So what do these results tell us? While they certainly cannot prove anything they are, in 
my opinion, nevertheless suggestive. At least when it comes to hydrocarbon rentiers, the 
resource curse claim has passed a first test, since their democratic performance is 
extraordinarily low. In addition, the authoritarian characteristics of many petro-states 
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41 We should, however, be aware of that some authoritarian mineral rentiers, such as Liberia, lack 
democracy scores for this period, and that faulty GDP figures for others makes it impossible to calculate 
rentierism in the first place. The observations least likely to be missing is of course those for relatively stable 
states, e.g. Chile and Papua New Guinea, which score high in democracy. 
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cannot be explained away with poverty. The Hydrocarbons variable actually correlates 
positively (0.2833) with GDP per capita.42  
 
 However, the test above is certainly a crude one and neglects some variables that 
possibly could affect the results. What if the authoritarianism in these states is not due to 
rentierism but in fact caused by another factor? Since Hydrocarbons correlates to a 
noteworthy degree with Islam (0.4312), as well as Mideast (0.5718) and Arabian Peninsula 
(0.6606) and each of these variables in turn correlate negatively with democracy (-0.4691, 
-0.3132, and -0.2349 respectively), it is certainly possible that religion and/or region could 
undermine the explanatory power so far bestowed on rentierism.  
 The proper way of handling this kind of data is as mentioned by using a feasible 
generalized least squares method, or FGLS for short. Table 1 reports the outcome of this 
regression, and while the relative effect of the presented coefficients is intrinsically 
problematic to estimate, I primarily look for three indicators: First I want to know if the 
effect is positive or negative. Second, I have to establish whether this effect is statistically 
significant, and finally I want to see what happens to the magnitude of the coefficients 
when additional variables are included. 
 In a first step I regress Hydrocarbonst-5 and Hard Mineralst-5 on Regime, under control 
for only Regimet-5 and Incomet-5. All dependent and control variables are lagged with five 
years. The outcome of this run is presented in Column 1. Additional control variables are 
then added to the regression with results reported in Column 2 and onwards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
42 Even if Herb [2003;8] surely has a point when he claims that poverty, in a sense, causes rentierism. 
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Rentierism and Democracy 
(Dependent variable is Regime) 
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
Regimet-5 .8268032*** .7804319*** .7427678*** .7481486*** 
 (.0095259) (.0104354) (.0108961) (.0108831) 
Hydrocarbonst-5 -3.17583*** -1.590148*** -1.535748*** -1.521891*** 
 (.3259647) (.3596939) (.3668574) (.3965848) 
Hard Mineralst-5 -2.141449** -1.985129** -1.166078 -1.069393 
 (.7501294) (.739) (.7334875) (.7354017) 
Incomet-5 .0000336*** .0000206*** .0000169** .000019** 
 (4.96e-06) (5.96e-06) (5.97e-06) (6.72e-06) 
Islam – -.0102649*** -.0075146*** -.0101893*** 
  (.0010757) (.0012455) (.0010893) 
OECD – .4783686*** .4456037*** .4362086*** 
  (.1293235) (.1255417) (.1284831) 
Size – -.2824265* – – 
  (.1308383)   
Mideast – – -.7906065*** – 
   (.1569705)  
Sub-Saharan Africa – – -.8974678*** -.7583373*** 
   (.0881361) (.0838) 
Arabian Peninsula – – – -.6535271** 
    (.2530646) 
Observations 3400 3395 3395 3395 
Countries 151 150 150 150 
Log likelihood -7130.17 -7061.678 -7011.189 -7020.495 
 
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level 
Note: Variables attached with “t-5” are entered with five-year lags. Standard errors are in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Regressions run with Feasible Generalized Least Squares, using Stata 9.1. First-order autocorrelation are 
corrected for using a panel-specific process.  
 
 
 The first regression (Column 1) shows both Hydrocarbons and Hard Minerals to indeed 
have a negative relationship to Regime, and this relationship is statistically significant at 
the 0.001 level for the former and at the 0.01 level for the latter. In Column 2 Islam, OECD, 
and Size have been added to the picture and while the coefficient for Hydrocarbons are 
cut in half the results hang on to their significance. This suggests that the ‘badness’ of oil 
and mineral wealth is not merely dependent upon religion or non-Western status and does 
not only occur in small states. 
 The final step is to include Mideast, Arabian Peninsula, and Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Column 3 and 4 disclose at least three points of interest: i) As expected all three regional 
dummies correlate negatively with Regime. For various reasons these regions are more 
authoritarian than are other parts of the world. ii) Even with this negative effect accounted 
for the Hydrocarbons coefficient stays negative and significant at the 0.001 level. iii) 
However, although Hard Minerals remains negative the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 
renders it insignificant.  
 
 According to Herb [2003:15] the Polity data set used by Ross and myself, is in this very 
context perhaps not the optimal measure of democracy. He claims that this measure 
carries a debatable bias against monarchies, and since many petro-rentiers have this type 
of regime this bias is potentially problematic. He exemplifies with the “bizarre” fact that 
Qatar in 1999, because of its monarchy, had lower democracy score than Hitler’s 
Germany. [ibid.] In his own analysis he therefore uses democracy scores from Freedom 
House instead. Following Herb’s criticism I check my results by replacing the Polity IV 
score (Regime) with the Freedom House Imputed Polity measure (Freedom House).  
 
Figure 3 
Democratic Performance in the World 1972-2003 
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Note: Democratic performance is derived from Freedom House data and presented as means. Values for 1982 are 
interpolated. Data on GDP per capita come from Penn World Table and rent data are brought from the World Bank. 
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Rentierism and Democracy 
(Dependent variable is Freedom House) 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
Freedom Houset-5 .813364*** .7588231*** .7322856*** .7352351*** 
 (.0093588) (.0102351) (.0108141) (.0107754) 
Hydrocarbonst-5 -2.920312*** -1.564299*** -1.576052*** -1.579584*** 
 (.2617032) (.2834751) (.2909047) (.3055123) 
Hard Mineralst-5 -1.928067** -1.879405** -1.498316* -1.455021* 
 (.6302201) (.6174708) (.6165067) (.6170341) 
Incomet-5 .0000229*** .0000102* 7.96e-06 9.56e-06 
 (3.83e-06) (4.69e-06) (4.59e-06) (4.94e-06) 
Islam – -.0098405*** -.0086709*** -.009843*** 
  (.0008711) (.0009845) (.0008855) 
OECD – .4771475*** .4524021*** .4394065*** 
  (.1027254) (.0985904) (.0999977) 
Size – .0133508 – – 
  (.0805253)   
Mideast – – -.3943838*** – 
   (.1214781)  
Sub-Saharan Africa – – -.4798038*** -.4157934*** 
   (.0698964) (.066862) 
Arabian Peninsula – – – -.3558369 
    (.1851819) 
Observations 3467 3461 3461 3461 
Countries 165 164 164 164 
Log likelihood -6477.783 -6389.634 -6365.443 -6368.86 
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level 
Note: Variables attached with “t-5” are entered with five-year lags. Standard errors are in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Regressions run with Feasible Generalized Least Squares, using Stata 9.1. First-order autocorrelation are 
corrected for using a panel-specific process.  
 
 
 A first quick comparison reveals that the simple correlation between the two measures 
is 0.9721, i.e. extremely high, and the mean-democracy graphs have a most similar 
appearance. The FGLS regression, however, yields a somewhat different result, but 
contrary to Herb’s premonition, using the Freedom House measure actually lends the 
theoretical claim additional support. In this run Hard Minerals in fact manages to stay 
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significant (at the 0.05 level) even after the inclusion of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
Hydrocarbons coefficient is persistently negative at the 0.001 level of significance 
throughout this alternative test.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this study has been to retest the findings of Michael L. Ross [2001b] and 
thereby further investigating the idea of a resource curse affecting governments in 
resource-rich states. The results largely support this hypothesis. The figures and tables 
above clearly indicate that extracted wealth does seem to represent a harmful impact on 
democracy. The first and foremost finding is that hydrocarbon abundance, measured as 
rents by GDP, arguably makes governments more authoritarian in nature, since other 
potential determinants such as income and country-specific past have been accounted for. 
That this negative effect keeps its extraordinary significance even after religion and region-
specific factors have been brought into the picture is indeed thought-provoking. The 
‘badness’ of oil revenues upon government is consequently not a phenomenon limited to 
the Mideastern region, nor is it dependent upon Islam. These findings are strongly 
supportive of Ross’ and also of the theoretical claims of rentier state scholars.  
 As for the supposed effect of hard minerals the results have on the other hand been 
less conclusive. While hard mineral rents also correlate with authoritarian rule, their 
‘badness’ seem to be to some extent dependent on the performance of African nations 
south of Sahara. When those are controlled for, statistical significance is lost. On the other 
hand it is noteworthy that the Hard Minerals coefficient is significant when using Freedom 
House as an alternative proxy for democracy.  
 While the effect of mineral wealth therefore is hard to affirm, it is apparent that the hard 
minerals included in this study have lesser ability to dominate the economy of a state, than 
does hydrocarbons, and do not seem to affect democracy as badly. I would like to stress 
though that the hard mineral rentierism of many states arguably is somewhat 
underevaluated by the simple fact that the data only cover ten different minerals. It is 
especially unfortunate that figures for gemstones are missing since they are extraordinary 
valuable and consequently generate substantial rents.  
 
 Out of the three questions presented in section 1, this study reinforces two and a half, 
leaving out only the claim of a hard mineral curse outside Africa. Note however, that my 
findings do not refute this claim, but weakly support it. The implications these results have 
for states, especially poor developing ones, that ‘decide’43 to put their hope in extracted 
wealth, are distinctly negative. 
 Not only does this study add to the rentier state theory and supports the notion of a 
curse of natural resources, in fact it also fortifies the persistent modernization theory. 
Rentier wealth indeed seems to be an exception to the rule that GDP per capita goes hand 
in hand with democratization. If the bad wealth is accounted for, this theory should gain 
significant explanatory power. This is however not to say that regions rich in resources 
should be left out of comprehensive democratization studies: it is instead a call for 
rentierism to be considered a variable of great import.  
 
 This research has not been conducted with the aim of finding a panacea for this 
puzzling phenomenon. I have instead presented the resource curse as an intricate trap, a 
 
43 To be sure, it is rarely a free choice. 
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catch-22, and such a situation may indeed prove problematic to grapple with. Institutional 
improvement is, for example, most often the adviced treatment for states grappling with 
the bad influence of natural resource abundance. But how is a resource rich country 
supposed to reform economically as well as politically and amend institutions if the 
problem in the first place is that resource wealth constitutes a significant obstruction to 
reform and makes institutions dysfunctional? The proposed solutions are thus often made 
obsolete by the very symptoms of the curse.  
 The resource problem becomes even more aggravated by the fact that commodity 
prices in recent years have hit all-time highs. According to Karl’s [1999:48] concluding 
words the possibility of successful reform is contingent on low prices since windfalls both 
tend to insulate leadership and cement adverse institutions. She wrote that after the price 
of oil had collapsed to about $12 per barrel. Today (05/23/2008), nine years later, it has 
ascended to eleven times that.44 Gold prices have also experienced a similar hike, 
climbing from under $40 per ounce in 1970 to over $1000 per ounce in mid-March 2008.45  
 In a Foreign Policy article from 2006, columnist Thomas L. Friedman develops what he 
calls the First Law of Petropolitics, stating that “the price of oil and the pace of freedom 
always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states”.46 Even if this correlation 
hardly should be considered law, nor the curse as inevitable, the findings of this study 
should markedly lower the expectations of democracy in many natural resource-reliant 
states around the world. 
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Appendix A 
 
Detailed Presentation of Variables 
 
All data have been accessed through The Quality of Government Data set, Göteborg 
University (compiled by Teorell et al. [2008]), with invaluable assistance from Marcus 
Samanni.  
 
• Regime is an interval variable that measures a country’s democratic performance. I 
derive this measure from the Polity IV data set compiled by Marshall & Jaggers 
[2002]. Position on an eleven point scale indicates a country’s performance regarding 
three general principles of democracy; i) the effective possibility of political 
participation, ii) institutionalized constraints on the executive, and iii) guaranteed civil 
liberties. These three basic concepts are held as the fundamental prerequisites for 
more specific democratic institutions. Countries are graded between 0 (perfect 
autocracy) and 10 (perfect democracy).  
 
• Freedom House is a similar eleven point variable that also measures democratic 
performance but is based on the combined Freedom House measure of Civil Liberties 
and Political Rights. I use the imputed version, which has better coverage. Countries 
are graded between 0 (perfect autocracy) and 10 (perfect democracy). 
 
• Income is based on real GDP per capita measured in constant dollars chain series. 
Base year is 2000. The data originate from Penn World Table version 6.2, by Heston 
et al. [2006]. 
 
• Hydrocarbons is a variable measuring the relative size of hydrocarbon rents in 
government, i.e. rentierism, and it is created in several individual steps. Resource rent 
is first defined as the collected profit of a commodity, after location-specific production 
costs have been subtracted. The rent per unit of output is then multiplied with the total 
amount extracted, which compute the total annual rent. This calculation is done for 
each mineral, each country, and each year. The rents from oil, gas, hard coal, and 
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brown coal extraction are then annually added to each other and ultimately divided by 
the country’s GDP. The final measure stretches from 0,00 (no rentierism) to 1,00 (total 
rentierism). The rent data cover the years 1970-2004, and come from the World Bank 
Adjusted Net Saving Data Center. The GDP data are in current dollars and come from 
the World Bank Development Indicators 2007.  
 
• Hard Minerals is an identically calculated variable but evaluate the relative size of rent 
from hard minerals in government. Ten different hard minerals are included: Bauxite, 
copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver, and gold. The ten rents are 
added to one another and divided by GDP, creating one measure per year and 
country, just like above. 
 
 The construction of Hydrocarbons and Hard Minerals have been accompanied by a few 
practical complications. The data for each mineral do understandably not account for every 
state, simply because not every single state has extracted, let’s say, bauxite. These 
observations should however not go missing but rather be coded as $0, which indicate that 
the country received $0 in revenue from that mineral, that year. So far, so good. But what if 
an observation is missing when the country in question very likely extracted that particular 
mineral? Take e.g. the data on bauxite rent for Zimbabwe 1998-2004. These observations 
should, judging from the figures from previous years, be coded as missing, not $0. But 
since Hard Minerals are calculated as the sum of bauxite and nine other minerals, this 
would unfortunately invalidate all observations for Zimbabwe during these years. That 
would clearly be non-optimal because Zimbabwe also extracted several other minerals 
these years for which data in fact are provided. To interpolate or extrapolate any values 
would require an in-depth qualitative analysis of each country and year, which is 
something that cannot be done here and now. I have therefore chosen to keep all original 
values as they are and code all missing values as $0, even those where extraction most 
likely took place. This is, to be sure, a controversial choice, but note that all minerals not 
included are by default also coded as $0. The combined hard mineral rents for several 
countries are regrettably already underestimated. 
 
 
• Islam is a variable measuring the Muslim percentage of a state’s population in 1980. I 
use only this year since the proportion of the population with religious affiliation tends 
not to change much over time. For countries formed more recently, figures of later 
date have of course been used. Data come from La Porta et al. [1999]. 
 
• OECD is a dummy variable coded 1 for the twenty-five countries defined by the World 
Bank as high-income OECD members, including; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea (Rep.), Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.A. All other countries are coded 0. 
 
• Size is a dummy variable coded 1 for all countries with a population below one million 
and 0 otherwise. Population data are obtained from Penn World Table 6.2 and 
measured every year.  
 
• Mideast is a dummy variable coded 1 for the following countries, classified by the 
World Bank as residing in this region (which include North Africa), and 0 otherwise: 
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Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
 
• Arabian Peninsula is a dummy variable coded 1 for the seven states found on the 
Saudi Arabian Peninsula; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen, and 0 otherwise. 
 
• Sub-Saharan Africa is a dummy variable coded 1 for the following forty-five countries 
that, according to the World Bank Country Classification, are located in this region, 
and 1970 had a population of more than one hundred thousand: Angola, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. All other countries are 
coded 0. 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Table 3 
Summary of Variables 
 
 Variable Obs. Meana Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
 Regime 4906 3,93 4,21464 0 10 
 Regime/FH 5264 5,22 3,51816 0 10 
 Income 5180 7713 8744,04591 170,55 84408,23 
 Hydrocarbons 5011 0,0536 0,12614 0 0,9996 
 Hard Minerals 5024 0,0114 0,04281 0 0,6739889 
 Islam 6160 24,66 36,29656 0 99,9 
a The means have all been rounded off.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Table 4 
Index of Top 20 Hydrocarbon Rentiers 1990-1999 
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Country Rentierism (mean) Obs. 
Iraq .8740946 3 
Turkmenistan .6111696 5 
Kuwait .3927908 10 
Saudi Arabia .3798523 10 
Nigeria .349137 10 
Qatar .34169 10 
Oman .3382714 10 
Bahrain .2819573 10 
Syria .278025 10 
Azerbaijan .2700923 10 
United Arab Emirates .2679998 10 
Yemen .2652231 10 
Iran .2526117 8 
Venezuela .2506637 10 
Libya .2484708 10 
Uzbekistan .2017763 10 
Angola .1977809 10 
Congo (Rep.) .1913127 10 
Russian Federation .1768083 10 
Kazakhstan .167819 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Index of Top 10 Hard Mineral Rentiers 1990-1999 
 
Country Rentierism (mean) Obs. 
Mauritania .1545155 10 
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Liberia .150018 10 
Papua New Guinea .1384624 10 
Chile .0650507 10 
Guyana .0647832 10 
Zambia .0569682 10 
Mongolia .0553037 10 
Guinea .0402552 10 
Suriname .038481 10 
Jamaica .0240437 10 
 
